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INTRODUCTION

Much of the current debate concerning labor-management cooperative efforts centers on section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act), which makes dominating, interfering with, or contributing to the formation or administration of any labor organization an unfair labor practice.1 On its face, this section may inhibit cooperative
efforts through a prohibition of management support for employee or* Throughout the

Special Project, this piece is cited as Special Project Note, Future

Cooperative Efforts.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
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ganizations. The effect of section 8(a)(2), however, need not be so restrictive because of the Act's underlying concern for the effectuation of
employee freedom of choice.2 A concern for employee free choice provides a means for permitting positive cooperative efforts,3 consistent
with trends in labor-management relations, while preventing the abuses
feared by the drafters of the Act.
An examination of the legislative history surrounding the passage
of the Act in 19354 is crucial to understanding section 8(a)(2) because
much of the debate on the original Act 5 centered on what eventually
became section 8(a)(2) . Although the stated purpose of the 1935 Act
was "[t]o promote equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees [and] to diminish the causes of labor disputes,"' the discussion surrounding the formation of this Act reveals that the controlling
intent of the Act's drafters was to eliminate the company-dominated
union." To effectuate their goals, the drafters structured the Act in a
2. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text; see also Note, New Standardsfor Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510 (1973) [hereinafter Note, New Standards]. This Note suggests redefining the terms "domination" and "support" to allow for a class of
assisted labor organizations if the employer is acting in good faith and the employees choose not to
have a traditional union. The author of the Yale Note contends that such a redefinition would
expand the freedom of choice guaranteed by the Act. Contra Note, Collective Bargaining as an
Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1662, 1663 (1983) (contending that "courts which have
interpreted section 8(a)(2) to permit employer-sponsored representation plans have erred by relying on ad hoc assessments of 'employee free choice' rather than focusing on the autonomy of the
challenged organizations and the importance of arm's-length bargaining").
3. See Rosenberg & Rosenstein, Participationand Productivity: An Empirical Study, 33
INDUS. & LAB. RaL. REv. 355 (1980). This piece empirically evaluated employer-employee cooperative efforts and concludes that an increase in productivity accompanied the increase in cooperative
activity.

4. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATV
AcT, 1935, at 3270 (1959) [hereinafter NLRA HIST.].

HISTORY OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

5. The original National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act, passed Congress in
1935. In 1947 Congress amended the Act with the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, popularly called the Taft-Hartley Act. The Act received further change in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. These later changes in the National Labor Relations Act left
the language of § 8(a)(2) unaltered.
6. The original draft proposed by Senator Wagner used comparable language in §§ 5(3) and
5(4). When the Act was enacted in 1935, the language, which Congress relabeled § 8(a)(2) in 1947,

was in § 8(2).
7. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3238
(preamble). The Senate Bill included this preamble through most of the debate, yet when signed
by the President on July 5, 1935, the preamble read "[tlo diminish the cause of labor disputes
burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations
Board, and for other purposes." Id. at 3270.
8. The company-dominated union is an organization formed and controlled by management
to represent employees. The company-dominated union, however, not only failed to represent employee interests, but also blocked any other organization from representing the employees. The
drafters of the Act distinguished the company-dominated union from the company union. The
term "company union" referred to an independent employee organization in a single company. See
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way that forces labor and management into adversarial positions.9 Contrary to the contentions of later cases, the Act's drafters did not intend
to promote cooperation between labor and management. The legislative
history indicates that the drafters were more concerned with cooperation among labor itself,'0 with the belief that if employees could increase their power through cooperation with each other, then labor
could bargain as an equal with management.
To facilitate an analysis of cooperative efforts under section
8(a)(2), this Special Project Note focuses on a form of labor-management interrelation, the employee committee, which plays a prominent
role in both the legislative and judicial history of section 8(a)(2)." This
Note does not discuss other forms of employee-employer interrelations
such as quality of work life programs, 2 quality control circles, 13 productivity sharing plans," worker teams,' 5 or employee participation on
boards of directors.' 6 An analysis of employee committees under section
8(a)(2) naturally entails examining the theory behind other cooperative
structures. Consequently, judicial attitude toward employee committees
usually is indicative of judicial attitude toward cooperative efforts in
infra notes 67.74 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
11. See Murrmann, The Scanlon PlanJoint Committee and Section 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J. 299
(1980). Murrmann explains the benefits of employee committees and notes that these committees
clearly violate § 8(a)(2). The author recommends new legislation to insure the existence of these
collaborative efforts. The Scanlon Committee is a form of productivity sharing plan. See infra note
14.
12. See Note, ParticipatoryManagement Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985). "QWL (quality of work life) projects focus on
interpersonal relationships among workers and the general 'humanization' of labor conditions." Id.
at 1739. Generally, the projects try to improve the overall quality, satisfaction, and significance of
workers' roles in the production process.
13. Id. at 1740. Quality control circles are small groups of workers that meet regularly to
discuss potential improvements and problems. These circles emphasize improvements in productivity and product quality. Id.
14. See Gold, Labor-Management Committees: Confrontation,Cooptation, or Cooperation?,
29 KEY IssuEs SERIES 16 (1986) (stating that "[p]roductivity sharing plans generally combine
worker participation in decision making with a group incentive plan that rewards workers for productivity gains").
15. See Note, Does Employer Implementation of Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516 (1973). This article explains the
various elements of the production team, noting that while such team efforts have produced positive results, they still clearly violate § 8(a)(2). A production team, as opposed to a quality control
circle or a quality of work life program, is a group assigned to run a particular section of plant
operations and is virtually autonomous in that section. Id. at 518-19.
16. See Moberly, Worker Participationand Labor-Management Cooperation Through Collective Bargaining, 15 STETSON L. R-v. 99 (1985). Professor Moberly "focus[es] on collective bargaining developments that have enhanced worker participation and labor-management
cooperation." Id. at 99.
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general.
The employee committee represents a form of employee representation that falls somewhere between a valid employee union and an invalid company-dominated union. Courts traditionally determine
whether an employee committee is closer to an invalid organization by
applying a set of judicially developed criteria.17 Although application of
those criteria to employee committees has a strong judicial tradition,
several courts have begun to depart from a strict criteria analysis and to
focus on whether such committees represent an organization freely chosen by employees. 18 This free choice approach provides a means of allowing beneficial employer-employee cooperative efforts which may
satisfy established criteria for a section 8(a)(2) violation.1 9 Although
some commentators contend that Congress should strike or rewrite section 8(a)(2) to allow cooperative efforts, 0 this Note concludes that legislation affecting section 8(a)(2) is unnecessary and possibly harmful.
Over the past fifty years courts have developed an interpretation of section 8(a)(2) that engenders an awareness of the drafters' intent and a
realization of current needs of American industry.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

8(a)(2)

The history of the National Labor Relations Act begins on February 28, 1934, when Senator Wagner of New York, former chairman of
the National Labor Board, introduced Senate Bill 2926, popularly
known as the Labor Disputes Act." The Senate referred the Bill to the
17. See infra notes 114-52 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 152-214 and accompanying text.
19. By examining whether an employer infringed an employee's freedom, the court allows its
investigation to step beyond the technical limits of the Act in order to support a positive, cooperative arrangement, which may partially offend the language of § 8(a)(2).
20. See, e.g., Murrmann, supra note 11; Note, New Standards, supra note 2.
21. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1.
The Labor Disputes Act was not the first piece of labor legislation in the United States. The
proposed Act paralleled, in some respects, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982)), which introduced the concept that neither bargaining
party could interfere, influence, or coerce the other party in the choice of bargaining representa-tive. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. Aside from having indirect ties with The Railway
Labor Act, the Labor Disputes Act was a direct outgrowth of § 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 15 U.S.C. § 107(a)(2) (repealed 1935), see infra note 70 and
accompanying text, whose language had ties to the 1932 Norris-Laguardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
The National Industrial Recovery Act, through Presidential Executive Order, created a National Labor Board which consisted of Senator Wagner as chairman, two representatives each from
labor and industry, and the heads of the National Recovery Administration's Labor Advisory
Board and Industrial Advisory Board. The initial functions of the National Labor Board were to
mediate disputes between labor and management and to report violations of § 7(a). Although the
Board was geared toward investigation and reporting of § 7(a) violations, it possessed no enforcement powers. As the expiration of the National Industrial Recovery Act approached in 1934, Sena-
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Committee on Education and Labor for hearings and evaluation. "
These hearings contributed significantly to the development of the Act.
Neither the original Senate Bill,2" nor its companion House Bill, 24 contained the key term "domination" until Senator Walsh, chairman of the
Committee, introduced the second draft of the bill.2 5 This second draft
served as a model for Senator Wagner's 1935 version of the bill, 26 which,
after additional hearings,27 eventually passed Congress 2 8 with section
8(a)(2) unaltered.
A. Development of Section 8(a)(2) Terminology
Section 8(a)(2) explicitly states that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by taking any action "to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it."2 An examination of the Act's key terminology highlights the salient points of the debate surrounding the
drafting of the final form of section 8(a)(2). The terms "initiate" and
"influence" appeared in the description of unfair labor practices in Senator Wagner's original draft, but were omitted in the second and final
tor Wagner introduced the Labor Disputes Act with the intention of creating a permanent Labor
Board with facilities to prevent problems originally targeted by § 7(a). See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW § 286 (2d ed. 1965).
22. The Committee held hearings on March 14-22 and March 26-April 3, 1934. See 1 NLRA
HIsT., supra note 4, at 31-1127.
23. The original Senate Bill contained §§ 5(3) and 5(4), which evolved into § 8(a)(2). Section
5(3) classified an employer's attempts "[t]o initiate, participate in, supervise, or influence the formation, constitution, bylaws, other governing rules, operations, policies, or elections of any labor
organization" as unfair trade practices. Similarly, § 5(4) made it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "[t]o contribute financial or other material support to any labor organization, by compensating anyone for services performed in behalf of any labor organization, or by any other means
whatsoever." S. 2926, supra note 21, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 3.
24. H.R. 8423, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1128
(introduced by Rep. Connery). The House version contained language identical to Senate Bill
2926.
25. S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at
1070. Section 3(3) of the re-draft categorized an employer's interference with, domination of the
administration of, or contribution of financial support to any labor organization as unfair trade
practices. Id. at 1087.
26. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprintedin 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1295.
Section 8(2) of S. 1958 made it an unfair labor practice for an employer "[t]o dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it." Id. at 1299.
27. The Committee on Education and Labor held a second set of hearings on Senate Bill
1958 on March 11-15, 18, and 19, 1935, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1373-1616,
and from March 21 to April 2, 1935, reprintedin, 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1617-2276.
28. H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2459
(introduced by Rep. Connery.).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
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drafts of the bill."0 Criticism of the term "initiate" reflected a concern
that the term would prohibit the initiation of communications, suggestions, or proposals.3 ' On the other hand, support for the term "initiate"
came from those who restricted its use to preventing employers from
initiating a labor organization.32 The drafters' decision to eliminate the
term demonstrated a desire to limit the Act's prohibitions.
The Committee also omitted the term "influence" from the final
draft of the Act, 3 noting that the very essence of collective bargaining
involves employer and employee striving to influence each other.3 4 According to Senator Walsh, the Committee believed that labor and management should be able to exercise "the right of peaceful persuasion."3 5
Although intentionally omitted from the Act, the terms "initiate" and
"influence" frequently surface in evaluations of employee committees
under section 8(a)(2).ss
While the Committee deleted these two terms, other controversial
language survived the debate and remained in the final version of the
Act. Most importantly, the Act contains the extensively debated terms
"dominate" and "interfere. 3 7 When an employer creates an organization that restricts employee cooperation solely to the individual employer unit, 8 the employer, by exercising a "compelling force over the
30. S. 2926, supra note 21, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1; see supra note 23
for the text of the Bill.
31. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [hereinafter Hearings S. 2926], reprinted in
1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 389 (testimony of James A. Emery, General Counsel, National
Association of Manufacturers).
32. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 257 (testimony of Otto Beyer, Federal Coordinator of Transportation).
33. S. 1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3273.
34. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 423 (testimony of James A. Emery); id. at 564 (testimony of Ralph F. Foster, Factory Manager, American
Laundry Machinery Co.).
35. 78 CONG. REc. 10,559, 10,560 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 1125
(radio address by Sen. Walsh on June 5, 1934).
36. See, e.g., NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 186 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (permitting employer-employee cooperation "as long as it does not take the form of a
labor organization dominated or improperly influenced by the employer"); see also Classic Indus.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that the employer violated § 8(a)(2) when
he "initiated" actual distribution of ballots for creation of an employee committee).
37. Senator Wagner's second and final draft of the Act included the terms "dominate" and
"interfere" in § 3(3). S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4,
at 1087.
38. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934) and in
1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 23 (Sen. Wagner noting in an article from the New York Times,
dated March 11, 1934, that "I do not refer to all independent labor organizations ....
I allude
rather to the employer dominated union, generally initiated by the employer, which arbitrarily
restricts employee cooperation to a single employer unit."); 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2333 (Sen. Wagner commenting that "[ihe primary
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collective activities" of the employees,3 dominates the employee organization.40 Senators Wagner and Walsh contended that an employer
dominated a labor organization by dictating the organization's constitution and by-laws, 41 by influencing its formation, policies, and elections,
by financially subsidizing it, or by discriminating either in favor of or
against its members through wage or hour differentials.42 The drafters
felt that no realistic collective bargaining could take place when the employer, by dominating the union, controlled both sides of the bargaining
table. 3
evil of the organization which is dominated or interfered with by the employer is that, sometimes
because of express prohibitions, more often because of its intrinsic composition, it is not well
suited to extend its cooperative activities beyond the bounds of a single employer unit"); Labor
Disputes Act: HearingsBefore the House Committee on Labor on H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) [hereinafter HearingsH.R. 6288], reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2488 (Sen.
Wagner further asserting that "the most common characteristic of the company-dominated union
is that the employer. . .does not permit his workers to band together with others who are not
serving the same company").
39. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 79 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934) and in
1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 24 (article by Sen. Wagner printed in the New York Times, March
11, 1934).
40. S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 25, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1104 (stating that "[t]here was presented to the committee much testimony ... to the effect that a few
employers had dominated labor organizations of their own employees by dictating the terms of
their constitutions and bylaws, by refusing to let these labor organizations amend their constitutions without the consent of the employer, by dictating to the organization officials the procedure
or agenda for meetings, by indulging in unusual favors prior to or contemporaneously with an
election of representatives by the workers, and by making financial contributions to one of several
rival labor organizations with the intent of inducing the workers to join the subsidized organization"); 78 CONG. REC. 10,559, 10,560 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1125
(radio address by Sen. Walsh on June 5, 1934) (commenting that "[wie found .. . many company
unions, because of the financial contributions by employers, were subsidized organizations [and]
that in many instances the employer dictated the text of the constitution and bylaws to these
organizations, paid the expense of holding meetings and elections of the organizations, [and] extended special benefits that attracted their employees to membership in the company unions. . ."); 79 CONG. REc. 7648, 7660 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2374-75
(Sen. Walsh noting that "[i]n some company unions the employer hires the hall where the union
meets, pays for the ballots, employs clerical help for the union, [and] pays salaries to the representatives of the workers").
41. 78 CONG. REc. 10,559, 10,560 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1125
(radio address of Sen. Walsh on June 5, 1934); 79 CONG. REc. 7648, 7660 (1935), reprinted in
2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 2373 (address by Sen. Walsh).
42. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 39 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
43. Id. at 213 (testimony of Mrs. Elinore Morehouse Herrick, Acting Chairman, Regional
Labor Board); Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at
2489 (statement of Sen. Wagner) (stating that "I cannot comprehend how people can rise to the
defense of a practice so contrary to American principles as one which permits the advocates of one
party to be paid by the other whereby [c]ollective bargaining becomes a sham [because] the employer sits on both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the spokesman of those with whom
he is dealing"); 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2333
(statement by Sen. Wagner) (asserting that "[clollective bargaining becomes a mockery when the
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The term "interference" goes beyond the term "domination" and
expands the scope of activities that violate the Act. For Senator Wagner, interference occurred if the employer participated in the management or formation of the constitution or by-laws of a labor
organization,"" or if the employees' association was subject in some way
to the employer's will.45 Senator Wagner indicated that generally nonoffensive actions could rise to the level of interference because of the
"unique dependency""' of the employee on the employer. Thus, the
term "interference" was intended to include any acts by management
47
that impair the freedom of action of the labor organization.

The term "labor organization" is another controversial item included in the final version of section 8(a)(2). 4 The Act itself provides
some insight into the meaning of this phrase in section 2(5).4 The origi-

nal draft of the Act defined the term "labor organization" as "any organization .

.

. of any kind in which employees participate to any

degree whatsoever."50 Even though the early language was broad, several experts still feared that employee committees, which they equated
with company-dominated unions, might be outside the purview of the
Act.5 1 To quell this fear, the second draft of the Act directly addressed
spokesman of the employee is the marionette of the employer").
44. Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2489
(statement of Sen. Wagner).
45. 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2334
(statement of Sen. Wagner).

46. Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HiST., supra note 4, at 2489
(statement of Sen. Wagner).
47. Senator Boland asked,
Is it "interference" for an employer to initiate a company union, to participate in its administration, to restrict changes in its constitution, to exercise a veto power over its decisions, to
influence its policies, or to contribute financial support to the organization or its representatives? . . . In my opinion, these, along with any other acts impairing the freedom of action of
labor organizations, should be deemed prohibited by the statute.
79 CONG. REc. 2332, 2337 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2443.
48. S. 1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3273.
49. Id. at 3271. Section 2(5) currently provides:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
50. The original draft provided: "The term 'labor organization' means any organization, labor
union, association, corporation, or society of any kind in which employees participate to any degree
whatsoever, which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, or hours of employment." S. 2926, supra note 21, reprintedin
1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 2.
51. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 272 (testimony of Edwin E. Witte, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin) (noting that "in subsection (2) of section 5, you speak only of representatives of the employees, and I submit that there
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the employee committee issue and further expanded the general definition of labor organization. 2 Senator Walsh, in the Committee report
submitted to the Senate, explained that the term "labor organization"
had a broad meaning to guarantee that the independence of action protected by section 8 of the Act would extend to all organizations that
dealt with employers on "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work. '5' The final change made
to section 2(5) of the Act, found in Senator Walsh's redraft, was the
addition of the phrase "conditions of work" in order to cover other
54
dealings between labor and management.
The last relevant term in section 8(a)(2), which added another prohibited employer activity, prevented an employer from contributing "financial or other support" 55 to a labor organization. This provision
attracted much criticism because a consistent characteristic of company
unions and employee committees was direct or indirect employer financial support. 58 Various groups argued that financial support, provided at
a level agreed to by both employer and employees5" and given to the
employees annually for their allocation," did not make an organization
subservient to the employer. 9 Others added that the clause was too expansive in the sense that "other support" might be extended to include
moral support, advice, or counsel.6 0 Some commentators even conis danger that your language does not include this most prevalent form of company unionism that
we now know, the employee representation committee").
52. The re-draft of Senate Bill 2926 stated that "[tlhe term 'labor organization' means any
organization or any agency or employee representation committee, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning hours

of labor, wages or working conditions." S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 25, reprinted in 1 NLRA
HiT., at 1086.

53. S.REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at
2300.
54. S.1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3271.
55. Id. at 3273.
56. Labor Disputes Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor on S.

1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) [hereinafter Hearings S. 1958], reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT.,
supra note 4, at 1876 (testimony of Harvey G. Ellard, The Institute of American Meat Packers).
57. Hearings S.1958, supra note 56, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1936 (testimony of A.B. Trembley, Chairman, Goodyear Industrial Assembly of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber

Co.).
58. Id. at 1797 (testimony of Jack Larkin, General Chairman, Employees' Representatives);
id. at 2120 (testimony of G.O. Bailey, Chairman, Association of Employees, American Telephone &

Telegraph Co.).
59. Id. at 1935 (testimony of A.B. Trembley, Chairman, Goodyear Industrial Assembly of the
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.); HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HisT., supra
note 4, at 715 (testimony of G.L. Fullmer, Association of Employees, American Telephone & Telegraph Co.).
60. HearingsS. 1958, supra note 56, reprintedin 2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 1829 (testimony of Robert T. Caldwell, Attorney for the American Rolling Mill Co.); id. at 1896 (testimony of
James L. Donnelly, Executive Vice President, Illinois Manufacturers' Association).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:545

tended that the clause was unnecessary because the Act already prohibited support that rose to the level of domination or interference., The
drafters' concern was that if an employer could provide financial support to a labor organization, then that labor organization would become
a subsidized group under the employer's contro 62 and could not function freely. 3 In response to the pressure against the clause, Senator
Walsh, in the second draft of the bill, 4 deleted Senator Wagner's original clause, "or other material support.

65

The clause did not remain ab-

sent and in the final draft of the Act the drafters reinserted the original
clause with6 6a meaning expanded by the deletion of the restrictive term
"material."

B. Central Themes of the 1935 Debate over Section 8(a)(2)
Aside from the technical aspects of the Act, the legislative history
indicates that several important issues permeated congressional discussion. One of these issues related to the strengths and weaknesses of the
company union and various other forms of employee organizations.
Senator Wagner believed that the company-dominated union was the
greatest obstacle to collective bargaining6 7 and genuine freedom of selforganization. s A company-dominated union is an employee representation organization that lacks independence and owes a dual obligation to
employers and employees. 6 The company-dominated union blossomed

as a result of the passage of section 7(a)70 of the National Industrial
61. Id. at 1712 (testimony of Walter Gordon Merritt, League for Industrial Rights).
62. 78 CONG. REC. 10,559, 10,560 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1125
(radio address of Sen. Walsh on June 5, 1934).
63. 79 CONG. REC. 7648, 7660 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2375
(statement by Sen. Walsh); Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra
note 4, at 131 (statement of William Green, President, American Federation of Labor).
64. S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 25, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1087.
65. S. 2926, supra note 21, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3.
66. S. 1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 3273.
67. 78 CONG. REC. 3443, 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 15-16
(comments by Sen. Wagner); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
68. Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2488
(testimony of Sen. Wagner).
69. Senator Boland described the company-dominated union as an organization
initiated and created by the employer, in which the employer participates in its administration and operations, in which he is represented on all the committees, and either supervises,
initiates, or participates in the decisions or exercises a veto power over them, in which the
employer can veto all proposals for amendments in the original charter of the organization,
and in which he provides the organization with financial aid and comfort.
79 CONG. REC. 2332, 2336 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2439.
70. That statute provided:
Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
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Recovery Act. Many persons testifying before the Committee supported
the company union and believed that the Act would destroy and eliminate these organizations,7 1 even though they had proved to be a beneficial means of improving communications between management and
labor. 72 Although the drafters of the Act contended that they were trying to eliminate only the company-dominated union,73 the Act, as a

practical matter, ended the company union 4 and substantially ham-

other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 15 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1) (repealed 1935),
reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 68. Senator Wagner viewed his original Bill as a
clarification and fortification of the provisions of this earlier statute. Although Congress had "attempted to open the avenues to collective bargaining," the statute "did not outlaw the specific
practices by which some employers set up insuperable obstacles to genuine collective bargaining."
Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) and in 1 NLRA HIsT.,
supra note 4, at 15 (comments by Sen. Wagner when introducing S.2926); see M. FORKOSCH, supra
note 21, § 286.
71. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 700 (testimony of James T. Young, Teacher, University of Pennsylvania); id. at 104 (brief of William Whitfield Woods, President, The Institute of American Meat Packers); id. at 564 (testimony of Ralph
F. Foster, Factory Manager, American Laundry Machinery Co.); id. at 691 (testimony of L.L. Balleisen, Secretary, Industrial Division, Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce); Hearings S. 1958, supra
note 56, reprintedin 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2148 (brief of James J. Cantwell, Employee
Representative, John A. Roeblings Sons Co.); id. at 1896 (testimony of James L. Donnelly, Executive Vice President, Illinois Manufacturers' Association); id. at 2056 (testimony of E.R. Lederer,
Chairman of Labor Subcommittee of the Planning and Coordinating Committee for the Petroleum
Industry).
72. HearingsS. 1958, supra note 56, reprintedin 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2057 (testimony of E.R. Lederer, Chairman, Labor Subcommittee of the Planning and Coordinating Committee for the Petroleum Industry); Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT.,
supra note 4, at 691 (testimony of L.L. Balleisen, Secretary, Industrial Division, Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce); id. at 564 (testimony of Ralph F. Foster, Factory Manager, American Laundry
Machinery Co.).
73. 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2333
(statement by Sen. Wagner) (commenting that "[a]nyone familiar with these laws will recognize at
once that there is nothing in the pending bill ..-which outlaws the so called 'company union', if
by that term is meant simply an entirely free and independent organization of workers who
through their own volition confine their cooperative activities to the limits of one company");
Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2488 (statement
of Sen. Wagner); Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 39
(statement of Sen. Wagner); 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra
note 4, at 23 (statement from New York Times article written by Sen. Wagner).
74. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 700 (testimony of James T. Young, Teacher, University of Pennsylvania) (noting that "Senator Wagner has
repeatedly said ... that he does not want to abolish all company unions .... Well, as they stand

there, they are so broad, so sweeping and drastic, that they would have the effect of destroying the
company unions even where the employees heartily desired them. . ."). Representative Connery
commented that the Act "will mean the elimination of company unions, not by force, but because
the workers when they have the opportunity to pick their own union without coercion will not pick
a company union." In response, Representative Marcontonio expressed his view that "[a] company
union incidentally is synonymous with an employer-dominated union. Once you remove employer
control your company union becomes an honest union or ceases to exist." 79 CONG. REc. 9668, 9699
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pered the growth of all employee representational organizations.
The debate over the strengths and weaknesses of the company
union reflected two major underlying beliefs of the drafters. The first
theme concerned the conflict between an amicable model and an adversarial model of labor relations. Those opposing the Act argued that the
Act's goal was the promulgation of adversity through the destruction of
amicable and mutually beneficial relationships and that the result of
the Act would be industrial strife and turmoil.7 5 In their view, the
proper model for industrial relations was one of mutual cooperation and
1
benefit.
The Committee responded to this criticism by claiming that its intent was not to prevent the normal relations and innocent communications that are part of friendly employment relations, 77 but rather to
(1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 3152 (statements of Reps. Connery and
Marcontonio).
75. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 104 (brief
of William Whitfield Woods, President, The Institute of American Meat Packers); Hearings S.
1958, supra note 56, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 1691 (testimony of Arno P.
Mowitz, representing the Full Fashioned Hosiery Association) (stating that "our main objection to
the practical phase of this bill is that you tie the employers' hands in an attempt to arrive at
amicable relation and working terms with his employees"); Hearings S. 1958, supra note 56,
reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1881-85 (testimony of Harvey G. Ellard, Institute of
American Meat Packers) (asserting that "the whole plan of this proposed legislation is opposed to
the basic philosophy of partnership and cooperation between employers and employees [and is
based] on the theory that dealings between employers and employees are necessarily hostile and
adverse"); Hearings S. 1958, supra note 56, reprintedin 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1896-97
(testimony of James L. Donnelly, Executive Vice President, Illinois Manufacturers' Association)
(noting that "[t]he whole spirit of this bill is to make enemies of employers and employees"); id. at
2148 (brief of James J. Cantwell, Employee Representative, John A. Roeblings Sons Co.); Hearings
S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 437 (testimony of Henry S.
Dennison, Industrial Advisory Board of the N.R.A, and a member of the National Labor Board)
(commenting that "[y]ou are acting here not for the short but for the long pull, and in your eagerness to cure immediate ills cannot take too much risk of building up our industrial system into two
armed camps-labor and management. .. ").
76. HearingsS. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 533 (testimony of Henry I. Harriman, President, United States Chamber of Commerce); id. at 462 (testimony of A.P. Mowitz, representing the Full Fashioned Hosiery Association) (stating that "I think
the average employer, when he becomes educated will realize that the old order has passed and a
new order is before us, and that an amicable approach from both ends to that new order is the best
solution of this problem"); Hearings S. 1958, supra note 56, reprinted in 2 NLRA HiS., supra
note 4, at 1991 (testimony of John Thomas Smith, Vice President, General Motors Corporation)
(noting that "Etihe bill runs counter to the common-sense theory of mutual interest, which should
exist between employers and employees in manufacturing operations"); Hearings S. 2926, supra
note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 565 (testimony of Ralph F. Foster, Factory
Manager, American Laundry Machinery Co.).
77. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 763 (testimony of Arthur H. Young, Vice President, United States Steel Corporation); id. at 718 (testimony
of Leslie Vickers, Economist, American Transit Association); id. at 533 (testimony of Henry I.
Harriman, President, United States Chamber of Commerce) (commenting that "[tihis Act. . . in
my judgment ...

will tend to increase rather than decrease the trouble ..

.").

1988]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

further democratic collective bargaining. 8 The Act's supporters contended that industrial strife arose as a result of company-dominated
unions. 9 Senator Wagner claimed that the Act promoted the concept of
cooperation within labor itself.8 0 He believed that only through wide
cooperation could labor gain the strength necessary to bargain with
management on an equal level,81 and that only when employees had
this strength could they cooperate with management.8 2 The drafters did
not want to force management and labor into adversarial positions, but,
to achieve their goal of eventual equality, they were willing to draw
some clear lines.
The second essential theme that surfaced in the early debate on
section 8(a)(2) was the issue of freedom of choice., The drafters of the
Act stressed that the employee was free to choose any representation
plan as long as it did not violate the confines of the Act.8 4 This restriction on the amount of freedom granted by Senator Wagner attracted
criticism from some,85 while others praised the Act for freeing the em78. S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 25, reprinted in 1 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1104.
79. 79 CONG. REC. 9668, 9716 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 3192
(statement of Sen. Truax) (observing that "[t]he various and sundry forms of interference within
referred to by employers, promote unrest, dissatisfaction, strife, and resentment, and revolt against
the existing order of things"); Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIST., supra
note 4, at 131 (statement of William Green, President, American Federation of Labor); 79 CoNG.
REc. 7565, 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 2334 (statement by Sen.
Wagner) (asserting that "[c]ontrary to the argument that the company union has the virtue of
insuring industrial peace, we know that this open entry of employers into the field of active organization of workers promotes strife and discord").
80. 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 23 (statement from New York Times article written by Sen. Wagner); 79 CoNG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 2321 (statement by Sen. Wagner) (noting that because "the isolated worker is ... [claught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed
by the size of corporate enterprise, he can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation with
others of his group").
81. "[W]ithout wider areas of cooperation among employees there can be no protection
against nibbling tactics of the unfair employer .....

78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprintedin

1 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 23; 78 CONG. REc. 3443, 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HisT.,
supra note 4, at 15 (comments by Sen. Wagner).
82. 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 24 (statement from New York Times article written by Sen. Wagner) (commenting that "[m]ost impartial
students of industrial problems agree that the highest degree of cooperation between industry and
labor is possible only when either side is free to act or to withdraw ... ".
83. 79 CONG. REc. 9668, 9716 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HisT., supra note 4, at 3192
(statement of Sen. Truax) (observing that "[t]his bill merely gives them an opportunity to choose
for themselves [and] [l]et there be no interference by the employer in respect to that free choice");
79 CONG. REc. 7648, 7650 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 2350 (comments by
Sen. Borah) (stating that "I want to see the workingman free to join a union or to remain out of a
union [and] free to form any kind of a union if it is freely formed").
84. Hearings H.R. 6288, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2489
(statement of Sen. Wagner).
85. Ralph F. Foster, Factory Manager, American Laundry Machinery Co., believed that "any
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ployee from the restrictions imposed by a company-dominated union.86
III. JUDICIAL HISTORY
An examination of the legislative history of section 8(a)(2) lays only
part of the foundation upon which to base an evaluation of the current
limits of this section. The other component necessary to analyze the
historical basis of section 8(a)(2) encompasses several Supreme Court
decisions, both preceding and following the passage of the Act. In particular, these cases emphasize the early judicial attachment to the concept of employee freedom of choice.
A.

Pre-1935 Judicial Perspective

An analysis of the judicial perspective on section 8(a)(2) begins
before the passage of the Act with Texas & New Orleans Railway Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks. 7 The Court decided the
Steamship Clerks case under the Railway Labor Act of 1926,88 a statute
that provided much of the inspiration for the National Labor Relations
Act.8 9 In this case, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks
sought to enjoin the Railway Company from recognizing and bargaining
type of labor organization should be permitted." While he opposed the company-dominated association "because it cannot accomplish any good," he feared that the Bill's effect on the company
union would be unnecessarily restrictive. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprinted in 1 NLRA
HIST., supra note 4, at 565. Similarly, Harvey G. Ellard of the Institute of American Meat Packers
stated that his industry "has no desire to register a protest against the principle which seeks to
guarantee the free choice of employees in the selection of their representatives for collective bargaining. It feels, however, that the choice should be wholly free, without coercion from any source."
Hearings S. 1958, supra note 56, reprintedin 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 1879.
86. Hearings S. 2926, supra note 31, reprintedin 1 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 149 (testimony of Dr. Francis J. Haas, National Labor Board) (asserting that "[t]he need of freedom from
employer domination is patent and this freedom the bil before you seeks to guarantee"); H.R. REP.
No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 2925 (noting
that "[w]hat is intended is to make such organization the free choice of the workers, and not a
choice dictated by forms of interference which are weighty precisely because of the existence of the
employer-employee relationship").
87. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
88. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1982)). The Steamship
Clerks case concerned construction of the following language: "Representatives ... shall be designated by the respective parties in such manner as may be provided in their corporate organization
. . .or by other means of collective action, without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by
either party over the self-organization or designation of representatives by the other." 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, T 3 (1982). The Court interpreted the third paragraph of § 152 as outlawing companydominated unions in the railroad industry. See J. COMMONS & J. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LAnOR
LEGISLATION

420-21 (4th ed. 1936).

89. In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress had in mind the experience in
the administration of the Railway Labor Act, and declared that the "bill is merely an amplification
and further clarification of the principles enacted into the Law by the Railway Labor Act." H.R.
REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HIsT., supra note 4, at 3048.
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with a company union.9 0 The Court concluded that the purpose of the
legislation was not to forbid normal, friendly relations, but rather to
prohibit the use of influence or coercion in derogation of a party's right
to "self-organization." 91 In the Court's view, the statutory scheme was
based on the concept of freedom of choice. 2 The Court held that "collective action would be a mockery" if one party could interfere with the
other's freedom of choice."
B. Early Supreme Court Construction of Section 8(a)(2)
Despite passage of the Act, the Steamship Clerks case retained its
precedential value. In two early opinions interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court cited to the Steamship Clerks case when analyzing potential violations of the National Labor Relations Act. In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.9 4 the Court reaffirmed the Steamship Clerks
holding that collective bargaining would be made a mockery if the
Court allowed interference with freedom of choice. 5 In NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.9 6 the Court examined whether an order
of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to withdraw recognition from a labor organization, and post notices to this effect, was an
appropriate remedy for a section 8(a)(2) violation.9 7 Although the case
was not directly on point, the Court stated that based on congressional
intent to clarify the principles of the Railway Labor Act in the National
Labor Relations Act, the Steamship Clerks case stood as viable precedent for freedom of choice.9
90. Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. at 554-55. While in the midst of a controversy before the
Railway Labor Board, the Texas & New Orleans Railway Co. formed a company union to prevent
an outside union from organizing its employees. Id. at 555.
91. The Court noted that "[t]he intent of Congress is clear with respect to the sort of conduct that is prohibited. 'Interference' with freedom of action and 'coercion' refer to well understood concepts of the law." Id. at 568. Likewise, in this context, the word "influence" would not be
interpreted "as interdicting the normal relations and innocent communications which are part of
all friendly intercourse," but rather as "cover[ing] the abuse of relation or opportunity so as to
corrupt or override the will." Id.
92. Id. at 569 (stating that "the entire policy of the Act" depends on "uncoerced action of
each party through its own representatives to the end that agreements satisfactory to both may be

reached and the peace essential to the uninterrupted service of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce may be maintained").

93. Id. at 570.
94. 301 U.S. 1 (1936). In this case the Court found congressional power for the NLRA in the
protection of interstate commerce.

95.
96.
97.
98.
note 89,

Id. at 34.
303 U.S. 261 (1938).
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 266 (quoting REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMm. ON LABOR, H.R. REP.No. 1147, supra
reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3048)); see supra note 88 & 89 and accompa-

nying text.
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In two other important Supreme Court opinions, which arose con-

temporaneously with Greyhound Lines, the Court strengthened the
concept of employee free choice. In NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 9 the Court reviewed an order of the Board that
disestablished an employee committee because of employer domination.
The Board found that control of the organization's form and structure
vested in both labor and management. 00 The Court upheld the Board's
determination and concluded that such control of an employee organization violates the complete freedom of action guaranteed by the Act.101
In NLRB v. Link-Belt Co.10 2 the defendant corporation's employees

formed an organization in response to the Act prohibiting their company union. 03 The Board concluded that the organization was not the
result of the employees' free choice' 04 because of certain benefits and
employer assistance provided to the organization during its formation. 10 5 The Court agreed with the Board's holding and stated that the
employer's failure to announce formally that the employees had a free
choice following the dissolution of the company union was a violation of
the Act. 06
99. 308 U.S. 241 (1939). The facts found by the Board indicated that the employer, in cooperation with his employees, put into effect an employee representation plan with employer financial support. Id. at 244. The committee contained an equal number of employee representatives
and management representatives, employee elections were arranged by management, and the plan
controlling the organization could not be altered without employer consent. Id. at 245-46. After the
passage of the Act, the employer revised the plan to eliminate all financial support. Id. at 246.
100. The Court noted:
[Wihere an organization has existed for ten years and has functioned in the way that the
Committee has functioned, with a joint control vested in management and men, the effects of
the long practice cannot be eliminated and the employees rendered entirely free to act upon
their own initiative without the complete disestablishment of the plan.
Id. at 250.
101. Id. at 249.
102. 311 U.S. 584 (1941).
103. Id. at 586-87. From 1933 until 1937 Link-Belt Co. maintained a company union. On
April 12 and 13, 1937, several employees who were disappointed with the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Act organized the Independent Union of Craftsmen.'On April 19, 1937, the employer
and the employees reached an agreement which dissolved the old company union and recognized
the new Independent. Id.
104. Id. at 587. The Court recognized that "[a]n 'inside' union, as well as an 'outside' union,
may be the product of the right of the employees to self-organization and to collective bargaining
'through representatives of their own choosing,' guaranteed by § 7 of the Act." Id. The real issue,
then, was not the insider status of the union but rather the employees' free choice.
105. The Board found evidence that representatives of Independent solicited employees to
join Independent on company premises and company time, while representatives of an outside
union were fired for similar activity. Furthermore the Board found that company foremen actively
solicited for Independent and that leaders of the old company union actively supported the new
Independent. Id. at 589-92.
106. Id. at 597-98 (finding that "[c]ircumstantial evidence makes credible the finding that
complete freedom of choice on the part of the employees was effectively forestalled by maintenance of the company union").
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The last important Supreme Court opinion in the judicial history
of section 8(a)(2) is NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. 107 Cabot Carbon is crucial to understanding section 8(a)(2) because of the Court's examination
of the definition of "labor organization" found within section 2(5) of the
Act. 10 8 The Court examined an employee committee that met with
management to discuss various topics traditionally negotiated during
collective bargaining. 109 The question was whether this organization,
which the employer had formed and financially supported, qualified as
a labor organization under section 2(5).11 ° The Board held that the
committee was a labor organization under section 2(5), but the Court of
Appeals reversed,' finding that the term "dealing with" as used in this
section to define an organization's activities meant "bargaining with."' 1 2
After reviewing the legislative history of section 2(5) and noting its reenactment without change in 1947, the Court concluded that Congress
intended the phrase "dealing with" to cover more than simple bargaining.113 This ruling reflected the Court's assumption that the drafters of
the Act intended to include employee committees within the definition
of section 2(5) and thereby ensure their independence through section
8(a)(2).
IV.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION

8(a)(2)

Building on these early cases, judicial interpretation of potential
violations of section 8(a)(2) traditionally centered on several crucial
questions. The first subsection shall examine how courts that found employee committees in violation of section 8(a)(2) answered these questions, while the following subsection examines factually similar cases in
which the court found no violation. The criteria addressed herein are all
factors in a balancing test by which the court decides if section 8(a)(2)
prohibits a particular organization.
107. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
108. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
109. Cabot Carbon,360 U.S. at 207 (noting that the committee "made and discussed proposals and requests respecting many other aspects of the employee relationship, including seniority,
job classifications, job bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage
corrections, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions").
110. Id. at 204-05.
111. Id. at 210 (citing Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 211-18. The Court first noted that in the congressional discussion the Secretary of
Labor proposed an amendment to § 2(5), which the Senate rejected, that would have replaced the
term "dealing" with "bargaining collectively." Id. at 211. The Court went on to note that "[w]ith
full knowledge of the terms of § 2(5) of the original Wagner Act, and of its legislative history and
judicial interpretation, Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act re-enacted the section without change."
Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
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Traditional Criteria of a Section 8(a)(2) Violation

Frequently, the first question in an analysis of an employee committee is whether the committee qualifies as a labor organization under
section 2(5) of the Act. Threatened committees often unsuccessfully attempt to avoid section 8(a)(2) by denying labor organization status.114
Since Cabot Carbon"15 courts have expanded the meaning of labor organization within section 2(5)16 to include any plan'17 or loosely

formed" 8 or "amorphous" ' 19 organization that discusses any of a variety of topics with the employer. 20 Based on judicial interpretation of
section 2(5), it would be ineffective to claim that a group is not a labor
organization because it was chosen at random from the employees,' 2 '
lacked formal organization, constitution, or bylaws, 22 did not make ex~
merely as a channel of communicapress recommendations, 1123 or served
tions

24

with the employer.

114. See Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc.,
458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. H & H
Plastics Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305
F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962).
115. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
116. See Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958). In Pacemaker the court
found a "loosely formed" employee organization in violation of the Act. The court concluded that
the committee had no formal organization, bylaws, officers, or dues, but such findings were immaterial when evaluating § 2(5) labor organization status. Id. at 883.
117. Ampex, 442 F.2d at 84. In Ampex management emphasized
that the committee had no formal organization structure, that employees who were to attend
a meeting were chosen at random from among groups of employees, that participation was
rotated, . . . that there was a separate grievance procedure in which the committee was not
involved, and that the matters discussed at committee meetings ranged widely beyond the
subjects concerning which employees and labor ordinarily deal.
Id.
118. Pacemaker, 260 F.2d at 883.
119. Clapper's Mfg., 458 F.2d at 419. In this case, the committee was inaugurated by the
employer as an "oral suggestion box," and it held meetings at the company's convenience, collected
no dues, and had no "semblance of formal structure." Id. at 418. The court held that, despite the
organization's "amorphous quality," "the committee was established in part to discuss employee
grievances and problems with management and did actually 'deal' with [management] in regard to
a number of such issues." Id. at 419.
120. See Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. General Shoe
Corp., 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951). In General Shoe, the court found that the employee committee, which was selected in an election organized and executed by management, received clerical
services from management, had no authority to make final decisions, and discussed a variety of
topics with management, qualified as a labor organization. Id. at 507.
121. Ampex, 442 F.2d at 84; see supra note 117.
122. See supra notes 116 & 119.
123. Thompson Ramo, 305 F.2d at 810 (stating that "express recommendation is not essential to 'dealing,' if discussion between respondent and the Association Board was designed to remedy grievances").
124. Ampex, 442 F.2d at 84 (committee formed to act as "suggestion box"); see Clapper's
Mfg., 458 F.2d at 418 (committee was "to serve, ostensibly, as an 'oral suggestion box' ").
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Another important question in applying section 8(a)(2) is whether
an employee committee was formed during an outside union's organizing campaign. Legislative history indicates that a major concern of the
Act's drafters was the use of the employee committee as a weapon
against the outside union. 12 5 Consequently, courts consistently view the
formation of such committees for the purpose of crippling an outside
union's campaign as a violation of the Act. 12 6 Although in many situations the formation of a committee may have had no relation to the
outside union's efforts, 12 7 an employee committee formed in the midst
of an outside union campaign may indicate an anti-union animus,
which in turn may trigger an investigation of the committee's underly12
ing purpose.
A third important issue is the extent of the employer's involvement
in the election of employee committee members. This inquiry may reveal the extent of the employer's control over the employee committee.
Even though the Senate removed the term "initiate" from the language
of the Act,'29 the courts' investigation of the election issue reflects a
continuing concern over who initiates the organization. Employers can
violate section 8(a)(2) by telling employees to pick representatives, 130 by
preparing, circulating, and distributing ballots'3 1 produced with company supplies, 3 2 and by posting the results of the election. 33 Because
the Act specifically refers to domination or interference with the "formation. . .of a labor organization,"'3 4 the employer's activity regarding
the election process may constitute a section 8(a)(2) violation in itself,
though courts often view such activity as simply one factor in their
125. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Classic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Fremont
Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 362 F.2d 702 (8th Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954).
127. See, e.g., Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. H & H
Plastics Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 678, 679 (6th Cir. 1968) (employee committee formed in June 1964
while union campaign did not begin until April 1965).
128. See, e.g., NLRB v. H & H Plastics Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1968) (finding antiunion bias indicative of violation); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967)
(finding no violation because no anti-union bias).
129. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
130. Lawson Co., 753 F.2d at 474. Lawson met with 35 to 50 sales assistants and told them to
pick representatives to serve on the committee that would discuss complaints.
131. Classic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir. 1981). When the outside union
began to try to unionize the plant, the employer decided he preferred to work with employees. The
manager had his foreman distribute ballots to workers to pick two workers to be representatives on
a new employee committee. Id.; NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803, 810 (1st Cir.
1964) (finding the plant manager "responsible to cause ballots to be prepared, circulated, counted,
and to have results posted").
132. NLRB v. Sharples Chems., 209 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 1954).
133. Prince Macaroni, 329 F.2d at 810; see supra note 131.
134. See S. 1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3273.
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overall analysis."3 5
A fourth factor involves the circumstances surrounding the employee committee's meetings with the employer. A court may ask
whether management called or scheduled the meeting, 13 6 whether management representatives conducted the meeting,' 7 whether high-level
management personnel attended the meeting, 3 whether management
took and posted the minutes of the meeting, 39 and whether the employee committee had an opportunity to meet outside the employer's
presence.1 40 A court also may inquire into whether the material discussed'4 ' at the meeting placed the employee committee within the confines of section 2(5).42 Furthermore, courts generally consider whether
an employee, in meeting with the employer and discussing issues deter135. In NLRB v. H & H Plastics Manufacturing, the court listed the following factors as
relevant to the question of management domination:
lack of any written governing instrument and lack of any independent means of financial
support. . ., meetings . . . on company property, the attendance at these meetings of high
management representatives, the taking and distribution of minutes by a management official, the fact that meetings could be called by a management official, the fact that employees
were paid for the time spent at meetings, management participation in elections, management
preparation and distribution of ballots, management determination of employee electoral
units, management determination of time of election, ...
absence of independent legal
advice ...
389 F.2d at 680.
136. See, e.g., Pacemaker, 260 F.2d at 883 (finding that "the [c]ompany determined the
number of employees to serve on committee, and the manner of their selection. . . the time, date
and place of meetings and paid the employees for attending").
137. See, e.g., Grand Foundries,362 F.2d at 709 (holding that the "[shop] Committee was
put into effect and promulgated by management, under the aegis of management, [and] utiliz[ed]
company space and time, with a management representative actively moderating the meetings");
Prince Macaroni,329 F.2d at 810 (finding that the employer "conduct[ed], at its own expense, the
election of members of the Committee").
138. See, e.g., Clapper's Mfg., 458 F.2d at 418 (finding that "[m]eetings were held at the
company's convenience, on its premises, and never in the absence of management"); see also Classic Indus., 667 F.2d at 207 (finding that the "[v]ice-president was present at every meeting, and
[that] he opened, closed and guided the discussion at most, if not all of them").
139. See, e.g., Prince Macaroni, 329 F.2d at 810 (finding that "[m]inutes of the Committee
meetings [were] made by the personnel director,. . . typed at [the employer's] expense and posted
on [the employer's] door"); Sharples Chems., 209 F.2d at 647.
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970) (stating that
the "record reveals evidence of a bland unilateralism in accomplishing management objectives").
141. Thompson Ramo, 305 F.2d at 810 (focusing on "discussion between respondent and the
Association [that] was designed to remedy grievances"); Pacemaker, 260 F.2d at 883 (looking into
"dealing[s] with company concerning grievances, wages and conditions of work"); Sharpies
Chems., 209 F.2d at 647-48 (finding that a "wide variety of subjects were discussed. . . includ[ing]
...pay, work schedules, overtime, pension plans and hospitalization insurance"); General Shoe,
192 F.2d at 504 (observing that "committees deal with the [r]espondent concerning grievances,
wages, hours of work, and conditions of employment").
142. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as one that deals with employers "concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condition of work." S.
1958, supra note 4, reprinted in 2 NLRA HIST., supra note 4, at 3271.
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minative of the employment relationship, can exhibit the same degree
of independence necessary for arm's length negotiation.14 3
A fifth question in assessing a potential violation of section 8(a)(2)
is whether the employer provides financial support to the organization. 144 Financial support of an employee committee ranges from direct
financial subsidies to paying employees regular wages, or a special salary, for the time spent in meetings with the employer. 145 Courts question the ability of an employee to bargain as an equal with the party
who pays his salary. 4 6 A majority of employee committees violate the
language of the Act, at least technically, because most employee committees function without independent financial resources. 47 Although
an employee may feel no compulsion to yield to an employer because
the employer is paying the employee for time spent at a meeting, several courts, by broadly reading the Act, show distrust of any form of
48
financial support.
The final element in assessing whether a section 8(a)(2) violation
exists is an evaluation of the actual structure of the employee committee. The Act itself does not demand any certain structure, but courts
often believe that an unstructured organization is easily subject to management control. 49 Most employee committees that violate the Act lack
143. See Lawson, 753 F.2d at 477 (asserting that "[tihe ultimate question with respect to
unlawful domination or interference is whether the employer has been able to 'induce adherence of

employees to the [labor organization] in the mistaken belief it was truly representative and afforded an agency for collective bargaining' "); Reed Rolled, 432 F.2d at 70 (holding that the "Board
could properly conclude that such a picture was one of subtle domination rather than of arm's
length, vigorous give-and-take bargaining between two self-reliant groups").
144.

Financial support prohibition comes directly from § 8(a)(2) language. See supra note 29

and accompanying text.
145. See Pacemaker, 260 F.2d at 883; Sharples Chems., 209 F.2d at 648; General Shoe, 192
F.2d at 506.
146. As one court has noted:
Collective bargaining becomes a delusion and a snare if the employer, either directly or indirectly, is to sit on both sides of the bargaining table; and, with the great advantage that he
holds as the master of pay and promotions, he will be on both sides of the table if he is
allowed to take any part whatever in the choice of bargaining representatives by the
employees.
NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1954) (citing American Enka Corp. v. NLRB,
119 F.2d 60, 62-63 (4th Cir. 1941)).

147.. See, e.g., Pacemaker,260 F.2d at 883; General Shoe, 192 F.2d at 506; see also Clapper's
Mfg., 458 F.2d at 418; Reed Rolled, 432 F.2d at 71.
148. See Annotation, What Constitutes "Financialor Other Support" Within § 8(a)(2)
Making Such Support of a Union an Unfair Labor Practice, 10 A.L.R.3d 853, 861 (1966).
149. See Grand Foundries,362 F.2d at 709 (observing that "[t]he employees had no meetings discussing the advisability or the desire for such an organization, and they actually played no
part as a group in originating and organizing this Committee as a representative bargaining unit
for employees . . .[this Committee] certainly was not set up to and was not so constituted as to
further free and unfettered discussion and consideration of employees' rights as envisioned by the
Act"); see also Classic Indus., 667 F.2d at 207; Reed Rolled, 432 F.2d at 71.
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a formal written constitution or bylaws. 5 ' Besides examining what
structure exists, courts generally examine who devised or created this
structure. 151 An employee committee that has a formal structure may
be more susceptible to employer control than an unstructured group
because the structure may be provided by or for the employer. 152
The criteria explained in this subsection compose the primary elements of a balancing equation. A court, using this traditional approach,
may assign any value to the various criteria to determine whether an
employee committee violates that court's interpretation of section
8(a)(2). No single element in the analysis is generally considered the
most crucial. In most cases brought under section 8(a)(2), an individual
criterion does not establish a violation. Instead, the combination of factors in the context of the particular industry and employment relationship may indicate a problem. The elements that compose this general
analysis represent recurring elements examined by numerous courts
that have attempted to define the difficult terms "support" and "domination." This analysis, however, does not provide the answer to whether
a committee should be dissolved. Rather, it merely presents questions
that should be asked in the overall balancing. Indeed, mechanical appliprocation of this criteria analysis has invalidated various beneficial
53
sense.
technical
a
in
only
8(a)(2)
section
violate
grams that
B.

Employee Free Choice Supplanting Section 8(a)(2) Criteria

Although courts frequently find an employee committee in violation of section 8(a)(2), judicial condemnation has not been universal.
Aside from the cases that fail simply for lack of a factual basis or lack
of section 2(5) organization status, 5 several courts have found no viola150. See, e.g., Ampex, 442 F.2d at 84; Pacemaker, 260 F.2d at 883; see also Clapper's Mfg.,
458 F.2d at 418.
151. See NLRB v. Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that the
employer created a "Progress Team, which consisted of two employees, elected in a companyconducted election, who were to bring employee complaints to the employer"); Grand Foundries,
362 F.2d at 709; see also Classic Indus., 667 F.2d at 206.
152. See Fremont, 558 F.2d at 891.
153. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
154. See Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961). The Board reviewed an
employee committee and found the committee in violation of the Act because of employer domination. The Board contended that the "Council is 'fettered' in its powers to 'follow through' on its
recommendations", that the company could eliminate councilmen by reorganizing, and that
amendments to council by-laws required company approval. Id. at 685-86. The court found no
merit in the Board's contentions; see also NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963) (overturning the Board's finding
that an employee committee which met on employee time without managements presence, and
which was overwhelmingly supported by employees, violated the Act). "There is nothing of substance to show invidious motivation on Newman-Green's part, or a result which affected the selforganization right of the employee ... employees supervised the election, counted the ballots, and
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tion based on the concept of employee freedom of choice. Courts have
expanded the theory of employee freedom of choice 1 55 beyond the drafters' conception 156 to allow employees to choose a labor organization that
may or may not satisfy some of the traditional criteria applied to section 8(a)(2). Along with an expansion of the concept of freedom of
choice, several courts have realized that cooperation is not necessarily
equivalent to domination or interference. 5 7 Acceptance of freedom of
choice and the concept of the distinct nature of cooperation has not
been universal, but acceptance by several influential circuits indicates a
promising future for cooperative efforts under section 8(a)(2).
1. Early Recognition of the Acceptability of Freely Chosen
Cooperative Efforts
Some of the early cases that recognized the acceptability of cooperation concentrated on the distinction between the terms "domination,"
or "interference," and "cooperation.' ' 58 One of the most frequently
noted cases drawing this distinction was Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB. 1 59 In Chicago Rawhide the Seventh Circuit found that
an employee committee did not violate the Act because the evidence
showed no actual domination, only potential domination.6 0 To the
court, the term "support," which the court equated with domination
and interference, implied some degree of control, while "cooperation"
implied assistance given to the employees in carrying out their independent goals. 16' In reaching a conclusion that promoted cooperation, the
court partially misconstrued the purpose of the Act as the promotion of
cooperation between management and labor 16 2 rather than the drafters'
determined the winners without any interference from management." Newman-Green, Inc., 401
F.2d at 5. The court concluded that the evidence did not support an inference that Newman-Green
interfered with employee free choice. Id. at 5-6.
155. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 573 (1st Cir. 1957) (holding that
the use of company property and time for committee meetings "shows no more than cooperation
by petitioner and a possibility of company control [which] does not constitute substantial evidence
of support or domination").
159. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). The court noted that "[a]llowing the use of Company
property, and even time, for employee meetings is not in itself an unfair labor practice .... We
are not going to permit the destruction of a happy and cooperative employer-employee relationship when there is absolutely no evidence to support a finding of unfair labor practice." Id. at 170.
160. Id. at 167-68 (asserting that the employment relationship "itself offers many possibilities for domination ... but actual domination must be shown before a violation is established"
(emphasis in original)).
161. Id. at 167.
162. The court reasoned that "[i]f this line between cooperation and support is not recognized, the employer's fear of accusations of domination may defeat the principal purpose of the
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conception of cooperation among labor itself.16
General judicial acceptance of employee committees has come
slowly. The first associations to rebut successfully section 8(a)(2) challenges were independent unions that had very little employer contact.""
In addition, these early cases emphasized the concept of employee freedom of choice. For example, in NLRB v. Wemyss'6 5 the court asked
16
whether the independent union was freely chosen by the employees.' 6
The court reasoned that the issue of domination depended on the subjective state of mind of the employee. 6 17 The court allowed this independent union to continue because the employees were free to choose
the union and the employer's assistance in its formation was minimal.6 8
Another early case rejecting a section 8(a)(2) challenge to an indepen6 9 Examining the hisdent union was NLRB v. Valentine Sugars, Inc."
torical setting surrounding the drafting of the Act in 1935, the court
stated that, although the Act evolved during a period of virtual class
war between employer and employee, 7 the Act did not prohibit the
employer from making courteous or friendly gestures.' 7 ' The court concluded that because the employees chose the independent union to reAct, which is cooperation between management and labor." Id. See NLRB v. Post Publishing Co.,
311 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1962) (supporting the "pattern of friendly and courteous cooperation,
or even generous action, of the sort [that] brings about the end result in labor-management relations sought by the underlying philosophy motivating the National Labor Relations Act").
163. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Post Publishing,311 F.2d at 569; Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862
(9th Cir. 1953). In Wayside Press, employees used a company printing press to prepare ballots for
a vote on whether to reactivate an independent company union, at a meeting held on company
time. The court found no violation of the Act in "the employer's affirmative urging of the employees to exercise their rights under the Act to organize an independent union," noting that
"[a]cquiescence or approval are not what the Act contemplates when it uses strong words such as
'interfere,' 'restrain,' 'coerce,' and 'dominate'...." Id. at 866.

165. 212 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1954).
166. Id. at 471.
167. Id. (stating that the question is whether the organization was the result of employees'
free choice, "in their own interests, and without regard to the desires of their employer, or whether
the employees formed and supported the organization, rather than some other, because they knew
their employer desired it and feared the consequences if they did not").
168. Id. The employer provided the independent union with facilities and opportunities to
contact the employees that he did not provide to the outside union.
169. 211 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1954).
170. Id. at 320 (contrasting the view "prevalent in some quarters ... that a class war, with
employees on one side and employers on the other, was not only irrepressible but desirable, and
that the proper, .

.

. normal relation and attitude of each to the other should be ...

one of suspi-

cion, distrust and even hatred" with the idea that the Act was designed "to assuage such feelings
and change such relations").
171. Id. at 320-21 (commenting that the purpose of § 8(a)(2) is to prevent employers from
"pretending to permit their employees to join or form an organization to represent them in collective bargaining, while. . . actually forming the organization or taking it over themselves, with the
result that they would have representation on both sides of the table, indeed would be dealing with
themselves").
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present1 them,
generous actions would not trigger a violation of section
2

8(a)(2) .
2.

7

Expansion of the Free Choice Analysis to Employee Committees

The early Supreme Court cases involving section 8(a)(2), which
showed a degree of deference to the broad concepts of freedom and cooperation, 17 3 opened the door to an expansive application of the concept
of employee freedom of choice to employee committees. In Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB 174 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a Board decision which
found an employee committee that met on employer time and property
with employer representatives to be a violation of the Act. 17 5 The court
stated that the facilitation of employee free choice was central to the
Act 6 but acknowledged that under a literal reading of section 8(a)(2),
any manner of cooperation would violate the Act. 177 The court, relying
in part on the Wemyss decision, stated that such a "myopic view" of
the section would inhibit the Act's objective of establishing the employees' chosen system. 7 8 The court concluded that to condemn the employee committee would signify acceptance of a purely adversarial
model and disestablish a freely chosen cooperative arrangement. 7 9
The First Circuit in NLRB v. Northeastern University"0 applied a
similar approach to the Ninth Circuit's in Hertzka & Knowles. In
Northeastern University the court examined a challenge to an employee committee that had no formal membership, no dues, no mass
meetings, and whose members needed management's approval to participate.' 8 ' Concentrating on the "subjective realities" and not the "objective potentialities" of domination of employee will, the court stated
that judicial precedent indicated some room for labor-management co172. Id. at 323.
173. See supra notes 94-113 and accompanying text.
174. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
175. Id. at 627. The employee committee was formed as a result of an outside union's failure
to reach an agreement with the employer. Both employer and employees participated at the meeting in which the committee plan evolved. Id. at 626.
176. Id. at 629.
177. Id. at 630.
178. Id. The court quoted the Wemyss case in which the court had earlier asked "whether
the organization exists as a result of a choice freely made by the employees, in their own interests,
and without regard to the desires of their employer." Id. at 630 (citing Wemyss, 212 F.2d at 471).
179. Id. at 631 (stating that "[w]here a cooperative arrangement reflects a choice freely ar-

rived at and where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression of
employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the Act").
180. 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979).
181. Id. at 1212. The employee committee was composed of 15 employees, selected by category of staff worker, whose purpose was to exchange information with management relating to staff
problems. The committee met with management during lunch breaks, in a room provided by management, to discuss terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 1211-12.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:545

operation short of domination.'8 2 According to the court, changing conditions in labor and management relations supported the argument for
"cooperative employer-employee arrangements as alternatives to the
traditional adversary model."18' 3 Thus, minor participation by management in employee committees was acceptable as long as the committee
represented the employees' free choice.184
3.

The Sixth Circuit Approach

While several jurisdictions slowly have accepted labor-management
cooperation by relaxing the strict criteria applied to section 8(a)(2), the
Sixth Circuit has established itself as a leader in adopting cooperative
efforts. The Sixth Circuit cases, which include Modern Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 85 Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 8 e NLRB v. Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co.,1 87 and NLRB v. Homemaker Shops,
Inc., 8' are some of the most influential cases in the field of labor-management relations. These cases expound a forward, modern view that is
consistent with current trends in employee-employer relations.
In 1967 the Sixth Circuit showed signs of accepting employee-employer cooperation in Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB 189 in which the
court reviewed a finding of the Board that an employee committee with
no constitution, bylaws, or dues, whose members received their regular
salary for meetings with the employer, and who met to discuss grievances with the employer was in violation of the Act.190 Evaluating the
traditional criteria applied to potential section 8(a)(2) violations from
the subjective standpoint of the employee,' 9 ' the court found that the
committee was the choice of the employees and that to suppress such
an organization when the employees were not complaining would be a
mistake. 9 2 The court concluded that the Act's purpose of encouraging
182. Id. at 1213-14.
183. Id. at 1214.
184. Id. at 1215 (observing that "even formal management minority participation on a shop
committee" is not necessarily illegal "so long as such representation reflects the employees' free
choice").
185. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
186. 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968).
187. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
188. 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984).
189. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
190. Id. at 202-03.
191. Id. at 204.
192. Id. at 203-04. The court noted that the "[t]he Board is not made either guardian or
ruler over the employees, but is only empowered to deliver them from restraint at the hands of the
employer when it exists." Id. (quoting Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.
1940)).
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cooperation supported the continuation of this committee. 19 3 While noting the primary purpose of the Act was the promotion of industrial
peace through collective bargaining, 9 4 the court permitted an organization to exist that satisfied the traditional criteria for a dominated organization-an organization the drafters might see as a major obstacle
to unfettered collective bargaining.
The Sixth Circuit closely followed the Modern Plastics analysis in
Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB. 95 An employee committee appealed a
Board order finding the committee in violation of section 8(a)(2) because the committee, which had no formal constitution, bylaws, or dues,
negotiated a contract with the employer. 196 The court's analysis acknowledged that the potential for managerial interference and domination always existed within the employment relationship. The court,
however, noted that the Act only proscribed domination that interfered
with the employees' free will. 9 7 The court stated that to draw the line
at anything less than actual domination would seriously limit "the very
cooperative efforts the Act was designed to encourage."' 9 8 The court
would find a violation only if management's actions actually undermined employee independence and freedom of choice.' 99 In conclusion,
the court not only reversed the Board's finding, but also praised the
committee as an excellent example of labor-management cooperative
efforts. oo
Two more recent cases reaffirmed this general approach. NLRB v.
Homemaker Shops, Inc.2 01 conformed directly with the approach
adopted in the previous decisions, while NLRB v. Streamway Division
of the Scott & Fetzer Co. 20 2 found a different means to achieve similar
193. Id. at 204 (asserting that "[tihere is a line between cooperation and domination, and the
purpose of the Act is to encourage cooperation and discourage domination").
194. Id.
195. 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968).
196. Id. at 917. The committee met monthly with the employer, except when it was negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Members of the committee lost no pay while at meetings
and were responsible for reporting back to other employees. The stated purpose of the committee
was to develop and maintain good communications between employer and management. Id.
197. Id. at 918.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 921.
201. 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984).
202. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); see Annotation, Employee Committee or Similar Group as
"Labor Organization" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 262 (1985); see
also Hogler, Employee Involvement Programs and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The Developing
Interpretationof Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB. L.J. 21 (1984). This piece examines NLRB v. Scott &
Fetzer Co. as an attempt by the Sixth Circuit to articulate coherent principles under § 8(a)(2) that
are flexible enough to permit employee-employer cooperation consistent with the court's
"nonadversarial" view of labor relations. Id. at 22. The author describes the Sixth Circuit approach
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objectives. In Homemaker the court applied the subjective test, first accepted in Modern Plastics, focusing on the employee's impression of
the employer's action on the employee's freedom of choice.2 0 3 The em-

ployer provided considerable assistance that enabled the committee,
which had no outside financial or administrative structure, to function.20 4 Noting the traditional fear that an unorganized committee
might be far more susceptible to management interference, the court
emphasized that potential control did not violate the Act.205 The court
concluded that as long as the committee effectively represented employee interests, "peaceful cooperation between the Company and the
Committee should be encouraged, not chastised."2 6
Another approach applied by the Sixth Circuit focused on interpretation of section 2(5)207 and built on the Supreme Court's expansive
definition of a labor organization in Cabot Carbon. °8 In NLRB v.
Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co. 20 9 the court refused to
extend the holding of Cabot Carbon to an employee committee. 210 The

court noted that the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon had not placed
any limitation on the term "dealing with" in section 2(5).211 The court
emphasized that not all forms of communication on personnel policy
violate the Act.2 12 The court also found support for a flexible approach
as indicative of "a flexible, enlightened view of labor relations." Id. at 27; cf. Schmidman & Keller,
Employee ParticipationPlans as Section 8(a)(2) Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 772 (1984) (interpreting
Scott & Fetzer and concluding that courts are lessening the protection provided under § 8(a)(2) by
narrowing the definition of labor organization under § 2(5), thereby encouraging the use of employee participation plans as a substitute union or union weakening devices).
203. Homemaker, 724 F.2d at 545.
204. Among other services, the employer sent notices of committee meetings, provided coffee
and space for the meetings, printed ballots for committee elections, and reimbursed travel expenses. Id. at 547.
205. Id. at 545.
206. Id. at 547.
207. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
209. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
210. Id. at 294 (commenting that "we cannot accept the Board's suggestion that Cabot Carbon should be read so broadly as to call any group discussing issues related to employment a labor
organization").
211. Id. at 292 (reasoning that because Justice Whittaker "did not indicate the limitations
...upon the meaning of 'dealing' under the statute, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the
issue").
212. Id. The court supported the reasoning of Judge Wisdom's dissent in NLRB v. Walton
Manufacturing Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), that "the Board's
policy against all employee committees (in practice, if not in theory) is a dangerous departure from
the law and one that may have unfortunate, far-reaching social and economic effects." Id. at 182.
In Judge Wisdom's view, §§ 2(5) and 8(a)(2) should be read "as contemplating employer-employee
cooperation, as long as it does not take the form of a labor organization dominated or improperly
influenced by the employer. One of the purposes of the Act was to soften the dog-eat-dog attitude
of management and labor in some industries." Id. at 186.
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to interpretation of the Act in Modern Plastics and Federal-Mogul.
Although the decision reaffirmed the circuit's approach in the area of
employee freedom of choice, the court believed it could settle the case
by limiting Cabot Carbon and denying labor organization status to the
committee. The court concluded by stating that a literal interpretation
of section 2(5) would at some point frustrate the purpose of the Act.21
These Sixth Circuit opinions exemplify a positive change in the judicial approach to employee committees under section 8(a)(2). Overly
zealous application of the traditional criteria would have struck down
these cooperative efforts, which the Sixth Circuit shielded with the free
choice analysis. A free choice analysis enables a court to protect an arrangement that it feels is beneficial, based on the subjective evaluation
of the individual court. Although the test is subjective, this approach
would eliminate a dominated labor organization in accordance with the
intent of the Act. The free choice concept is a response to the current
needs of industry in order to protect cooperation that would not survive
a mechanical application of the traditional criteria. Since 1935 labor's
status in the employment relationship has changed. Consequently, employees are now able to make certain choices regarding their conditions
of employment. If employees wish to join management in cooperative
efforts, the free choice analysis ensures that such arrangements can
survive.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The drafters of section 8(a)(2) intended to foster the growth of employee organizations by insulating them from employer influence. The
drafters wrote section 8(a)(2) broadly to prevent any subtle influence by
the employer over employee representation organizations. The only cooperation envisioned by the drafters of the Act was cooperation among
labor itself. Cooperation between management and labor would be acceptable only at a later stage of employee organization development
when employee organizations would be independent and strong enough
to choose freely between cooperation and contention. Since the drafting
of section 8(a)(2), labor organizations have matured sufficiently so that
they are in a strong enough position to negotiate with management.
With the fruition of many of the drafters' goals comes the realization
that labor-management cooperation no longer should be stifled by a
rigid application of section 8(a)(2).
213. Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 293. The court stated that its previous decisions "indicate,
however, that our circuit is willing to reject a rigid interpretation of the statute and instead consider whether the employer's behavior fosters employee free expression and choice. ..
Id.
214. Id. at 295.
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Courts are beginning to realize that the goals of the 1935 Act are
being achieved. The early court decisions following the original protective attitude of the drafters of the Act struck any arrangement that had
any sign of employer support or domination. These decisions now attract less favorable attention. The use of the traditional criteria to invalidate any arrangement that conflicts with a strict reading of section
8(a)(2) now seems outdated. As employee representation organizations
grow in size and strength, courts have begun to sense that strict protection is no longer necessary. These courts believe that freely chosen cooperation should be permitted, but they acknowledge that courts are
bound to apply the criteria consistently used in cases concerning section
8(a)(2). Consequently, these courts continue to apply the traditional
criteria, but add the employee free choice element to their balancing
test.
While some authors have argued that section 8(a)(2) should be repealed or amended to facilitate cooperative efforts,21 5 this Note contends that new legislation should not be enacted. The gradual
acceptance of the free choice concept method means the growth of a
practical method of evaluating the beneficial nature of a cooperative
effort. This free choice approach allows courts to evaluate a program
individually, supporting those that are beneficial and striking those that
are harmful. One element new legislation might properly address is the
acceptability of programs that do not represent an uncoerced decision
by the employee.
The freedom of choice approach applied to the traditional 8(a)(2)
analysis provides the flexibility necessary to promote economic growth.
New legislation cannot balance all the interests that have become intricately woven into the working interpretation of 8(a)(2) over the past
fifty years. Although labor and management relations have changed significantly since 1935, a flexible reading of the current legislation, within
the framework of free choice, will be more productive than the development of new, untested legislation. The concept of furthering employees'
free choice has its roots in early cases and the legislative debate. Although free choice appeared early in the discussion of section 8(a)(2),
the concept sat dormant until various courts revived it in order to overcome the section's mechanical application. The willingness of some
215. See Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021 (1987). The author supports the decisions by several
courts of appeals not to find a violation of § 8(a)(2), yet contends such decisions violate congressional intent in passing the Wagner Act. The Note concludes that Congress is the proper agent of
change and should repeal § 8(a)(2).
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courts to use the concept of freedom of choice in the area of employee
committees to support a cooperative effort may indicate a willingness to
support other forms of freely chosen cooperative arrangements.
David H. Brody

